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Abstract—Internet users such as individuals and organizations are
subject to different types of epidemic risks such as worms, viruses, spams,
and botnets. To reduce the probability of risk, an Internet user generally
invests in traditional security mechanisms like anti-virus and anti-spam
software, sometimes also known as self-defense mechanisms. However,
according to security experts, such software (and their subsequent
advancements) will not completely eliminate risk. Recent research efforts
have considered the problem of residual risk elimination by proposing
the idea of cyber-insurance. In this regard, an important research
problem is resolving information asymmetry issues associated with cyber-
insurance contracts. In this paper we propose three mechanisms to resolve
information asymmetry in cyber-insurance. Our mechanisms are based
on the Principal-Agent (PA) model in microeconomic theory. We show
that (1) optimal cyber-insurance contracts induced by our mechanisms
only provide partial coverage to the insureds. This ensures greater self-
defense efforts on the part of the latter to protect their computing
systems, which in turn increases overall network security, (2) the level
of deductible per network user contract increases in a concave manner
with the topological degree of the user, and (3) a market for cyber-
insurance can be made to exist in the presence of monopolistic insurers
under effective mechanism design. Our methodology is applicable to any
distributed network scenario in which a framework for cyber-insurance
can be implemented.
Keywords - cyber-insurance, self-defense investments, information
asymmetry, topological degree, microeconomics
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become a fundamental and an integral part of our daily
lives. Billions of people nowadays are using the Internet for various types
of applications. However, all these applications are running on a network,
that was built under assumptions, some of which are no longer valid for
today’s applications, e,g., that all users on the Internet can be trusted
and that there are no malicious elements propagating in the Internet. On
the contrary, the infrastructure, the users, and the services offered on
the Internet today are all subject to a wide variety of risks. These risks
include distributed denial of service attacks, intrusions of various kinds,
hacking, phishing, worms, viruses, spams, etc. In order to counter the
threats posed by the risks, Internet users1 have traditionally resorted to
antivirus and anti-spam softwares, firewalls, and other add-ons to reduce
the likelihood of being affected by threats. In practice, a large industry
(companies like Symantec, McAfee, etc.) as well as considerable research
efforts are currently centered around developing and deploying tools and
techniques to detect threats and anomalies in order to protect the Internet
infrastructure and its users from the negative impact of the anomalies.
However, security experts [4] claim that it is impossible to achieve
perfect/near-perfect Internet security just via technological advancements.
A. Why Technological Advancements Aren’t Enough?
In the past one and half decade, risk protection techniques from a
variety of computer science fields such as cryptography, hardware engi-
neering, and software engineering have continually made improvements.
Inspite of such improvements, recent articles by Anderson [3][4][5] have
1The term ‘users’ may refer to both, individuals and organizations. The
network under consideration may be the Internet or any other distributed
communication network where users have access to the Internet.
stated that it is impossible to achieve a 100% Internet security protection.
The authors attribute this impossibility primarily to six reasons:
1) Existing technical solutions are not sound, i.e.,there do not always
exist fool-proof ways to detect and identify even well dened threats;
for example, even state of the art detectors of port scanners and
other known anomalies suffer from positive rates of false positives
and false negatives [14]. In addition, the originators of threats, and
the threats they produce, evolve automatically in response to detec-
tion and mitigation solutions being deployed, which makes it harder
to detect and mitigate evolving threat signatures and characteristics
[36]. Finally, completely eliminating risks would require the use
of formal methods to design provably secure systems - however,
these methods capture with difficulty the presence of those messy
humans, even non malicious humans, in the loop [26].
2) The Internet is a distributed system, where the system users have
divergent security interests and incentives, leading to the problem
of ‘misaligned incentives’ amongst users. For example, a rational
Internet user might well spend $20 to stop a virus trashing its
hard disk, but would hardly have any incentive to invest sufficient
amounts in security solutions to prevent its computer being used
by an attacker for a service-denial attack on a wealthy corporation
like an Amazon or a Microsoft [35]. Thus, it is evident that the
problem of misaligned incentives can be resolved only if liabilities
are assigned to parties (users) that can best manage risk.
3) The risks faced by Internet users are often correlated and in-
terdependent. As a result a user taking protective action in an
Internet like distributed system creates positive externalities [16]
for other networked users that in turn may discourage them from
making appropriate security investments, leading to the ‘free-
riding’ problem [9][12][24][27]. The free-riding problem leads to
suboptimal network security.
4) Network externalities due to lock-in and first-mover effects of
security software vendors affect the adoption of more advanced
technology [3].
5) Many security software markets have aspects of a lemons market
[2] or even worse, i.e., by looking at security software, even the
vendor does not know how secure its software is [5]. So buyers have
no reason to pay for more protection, and vendors are disinclined to
invest time, money, and effort to strengthen their security software
code.
B. The Advent of Cyber-insurance
In view of the above mentioned inevitable barriers to 100% risk
mitigation, the need arises for alternative methods of risk management
in the Internet. Anderson and Moore [4] state that microeconomics,
game theory, and psychology will play as vital a role in effective risk
management in the modern and future Internet, as did the mathematics
of cryptography a quarter century ago. In this regard, cyber-insurance is
a psycho-economic-driven risk-management technique, where risks are
transferred to a third party, i.e., an insurance company, in return for
a fee, i.e., the insurance premium. The concept of cyber-insurance is
growing in importance amongst security engineers. The reason for this
is three fold: 1) ideally, cyber-insurance increases Internet user safety
because the insured increases self-defense as a rational response to
the increase in insurance premium [13][15][33][38]. This fact has also
been mathematically proven by the authors in [17][20], 2) in the IT
industry, the mindset of ‘absolute protection’ is slowly changing with
the realization that absolute security is impossible and too expensive
to even approach, while adequate security is good enough to enable
normal functions - the rest of the risk that cannot be mitigated can
be transferred to a third party [22], and 3) cyber-insurance will lead
to a market solution that will be aligned with economic incentives of
cyber-insurers and users (individuals/organizations) - the cyber-insurers
will earn profit from appropriately pricing premiums, whereas users will
seek to hedge potential losses. In practice, users generally employ a
simultaneous combination of retaining, mitigating, and insuring risks [32].
C. Cyber-insurance and Information Asymmetry
Sufficient evidence exists in daily life (e.g., in the form of auto
and health insurance) as well as in the academic literature (specif-
ically focused on cyber-insurance[13][15][17][20][33] that insurance-
based solutions are useful approaches to pursue, i.e., as a complement
to other security measures (e.g., anti-virus software). However, despite
all promises, current cyber-insurance markets are non-competitive, spe-
cialized, and non-liquid. The inability of cyber-insurance in becoming a
common reality is due to a number of unresolved research challenges
as well as practical considerations. The most prominent amongst them
are information asymmetry between the insurer and the insured, and the
interdependent and correlated nature of cyber-risks [6][7]. Information
asymmetry has a significant effect on most insurance environments, and is
comprised of two components: (i) the inability of the insurer to distinguish
between users of different (high and low risk) types, i.e., the adverse
selection problem, and (ii) users undertaking actions (i.e., reckless be-
havior) that affect loss probability after the insurance contract is signed
knowing that they would be insured, i.e., the moral hazard problem. In
the Internet, or as a matter of fact in any distributed communication
network, some examples of information asymmetry that could arise due
to (i) insurers lacking vital information regarding applications, software
products installed by Internet users, and security maintenance habits,
which correlate to the risk types of users, and (ii) users hiding information
about their reckless behavioral intentions from their insurers, after they
get insured, knowing that they would be compensated irrespective of their
malicious behavior (e.g., accessing malicious websites, being careless
with security settings, etc.,). This behavior by users affects the overall
network security strength and might cause financial loss to cyber-insurers.
D. Our Research Contributions
In this paper we model realistic, i.e., imperfect2 , single insurer (e.g.,
ISP or a government agency) cyber-insurance markets for distributed
network environments and jointly address the adverse selection and moral
hazard problem in cyber-insurance. (See Section III). We design optimal
cyber-insurance contracts under information asymmetry scenarios. Our
design mechanisms are based on the Principal-Agent (PA) model, which
is built upon the theory of mechanism design in microeconomic theory
[23] (See Section IV). PA modeling is considered a powerful tool
used in microeconomic theory to tackle situations of information non-
transparency between economic entities [23]. As part of our results in
Section IV, we mathematically show
1) Optimal cyber-insurance contracts induced by our mechanisms
only provide partial coverage to the insureds, thereby ensuring
greater self-defense efforts on the part of the latter to protect their
computing systems, which in turn increase overall network security.
2) The level of insurance deductible charged per network user in-
creases in a concave manner with increase in the topological degree
of the user.
3) A market for cyber-insurance can be made to exist3 in the pres-
ence of monopolistic insurers under effective mechanism design,
2A perfect insurance market is one where there is no information asymmetry
between the cyber-insurer and the insured.
3 A situation of market equilibrium where both the insurers, as well as their
clients are well-off with respect to their insurance contracts.
provided buying insurance is made mandatory for users. This result
takes a step forward on the result in [25], where the authors
prove the non-existence of market equilibrium under the absence
of mechanism design.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we briefly survey existing research work on cyber-
insurance under the following two categories.
A. Self-Defense Investments and Cyber-insurance
The field of cyber-insurance in networked environments has been
triggered by recent results on the amount of individual user self-defense
investments in the presence of network externalities. The authors in
[9][12][18][19][24][27] mathematically show that Internet users invest too
little in self-defense mechanisms relative to the socially efficient level, due
to the presence of network externalities. These works just highlight the
role of positive externalities in preventing users from investing optimally
in self-defense investments. Thus, the challenge to improving overall
network security lies in incentivizing end-users to invest in sufficient
amount of self-defense investments inspite of the positive externalities
they experience from other users investing in the network. In response
to the challenge, the works in [18][19] modeled network externalities
and showed that a tipping phenomenon is possible, i.e., in a situation
of low level of self-defense, if a certain fraction of population decides
to invest in self-defense mechanisms, it could trigger a large cascade of
adoption in security features, thereby strengthening the overall Internet
security. However, they did not state how the tipping phenomenon could
be realized in practice. In a series of recent works [17][20], Lelarge and
Bolot have stated that under conditions of no information asymmetry
[1][11] between the insurer and the insured, cyber-insurance incentivizes
Internet user investments in self-defense mechanisms, thereby paving the
path to trigger a cascade of adoption. They also show that investments
in both self-defense mechanisms and insurance schemes are quite inter-
related in maintaining a socially efficient level of security on the Internet.
B. Tackling Information Asymmetry
Inspite of Lelarge and Bolot proposing the role of cyber-insurance
for networked environments in incentivizing increasing user security
investments, its common knowledge that the market for cyber-insurance
has not blossomed with respect to its promised potential. Most re-
cent works[7][25] have attributed the underdeveloped market for cyber-
insurance due to 1. interdependent security, 2. correlated risk, and 3.
information asymmetries. Thus, the need of the hour is to develop cyber-
insurance solutions targeting these three issues, and identify other factors
that might play an important role in promoting a developed cyber-
insurance market. The works in [10][17][20][34] touch upon the notion of
information asymmetry and the effect it has on the insurance parameters,
however none of the works explicitly model information asymmetry. In
relation to tackling information asymmetry, the authors in [10][17][25]
propose the concept of premium differentiation and fines to promote
cyber-insurance. Another approach to resolving information asymmetry
is via security auditing [4], where an auditing agency does an extensive
introspection of the security behavior of an organization and passes on
the information to an insurance agency, which in turn designs the optimal
insurance contract based on the introspection report. However, there are
privacy concerns associated with this approach when it comes to handling
non-organizational users, and might pose regulatory constraints upon the
audit agency in the first place.
Based on existing works it is clear that tackling information asym-
metry formally has been an unchartered territory in cyber-insurance
research. Improving upon existing related works, we take a first step
in this direction and propose a formal model to resolve the information
asymmetry problem in distributed communication networks. Assuming
that cyber-insurance is made mandatory [28], our model enables existence
of cyber-insurance markets, i.e., the existence of market equilibria, under
non-ideal insurance environments. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first model of its kind specific to Internet and distributed network
environments.
III. MODEL
We structure this section in two parts. In the first part we de-
scribe the network environment and user utility functions pertaining to
any distributed communication network. In the second part we model
information asymmetry in cyber-insurance. We use the terms ‘user’,
‘Internet user’, and ‘network user’ interchangeably to denote users in any
communication network having Internet access. We also interchangeably
use the terms ‘user’ , ‘client’, and ‘insured’.
A. Network Structure
We consider a set N = {1, ......, n} of n Internet users, where the
connections between them form a graph G = (V,E), where vij = 1
(edge weight between nodes (users) i and j) if the utility of user i is
affected by the security (self-defense) investment of user j, i being not
equal to j, and 0 otherwise. Let Ni(v) = {j|vij = 1} denote the set
of all the one hop neighbors of i, where v ǫ {0, 1}n×n is a matrix of
connections amongst nodes. We represent the degree of a node i by di,
where di equals |Ni(v)|.
B. User Payoffs
We model the utility/payoff to each user i as Ui, which is a function
of the security investments made by himself, his one hop neighbors, and
his final wealth4. We assume that the cyber-insurer knows the utility
function of its clients5, and designs contracts based on it, and the type
of adverse selection scenario (See next subsection.). Mathematically,
Ui = Ui(Wi, xi,
−→x Ni(v)), where
−→x Ni(v) is the vector of security
investments of the one hop neighbors of user i, and Wi is the final wealth
of user i. From the structure of user utility functions, we observe that
two users having the same degree and final wealth will have the same
utility function. We also model the concept of a positive externality as it
influences user self-defense investment decisions. A positive externality
to a user from its one hop neighbors results when the latter invest in
security, thereby improving the individual security strength of the user.
We represent the concept mathematically in the following manner: we
say that a payoff function exhibits positive externalities if for each Ui
and for all −→x ≥ −→x ′, Ui(xi,−→x ,Wi) ≥ Ui(xi,−→x ′,Wi), where −→x and
−→x ′ are the vectors of security investments of one hop neighbors of user
i and Wi is the final wealth of user i.
In scenarios where the security strength of a user i depends on the sum
of investments of himself and other neighboring users, we mathematically
formulate i’s utility/payoff function as follows:
Ui(Wi, xi,
−→x Ni(v)) = f

xi + λ
di∑
j=1
xj , xi,Wi

 , (1)
where f(·) is a non-decreasing function of −→x , xi, and Wi. λ is a real
scalar quantity which determines the magnitude of the positive externality
experienced by user i due to the security investments made by his one-hop
neighbors.
In this paper we assume the utility functions of Internet users to
be of the strategic substitute type exhibiting positive externalities. We
say that a utility/payoff function exhibits strategic substitutes or is
submodular if it exhibits the property of decreasing differences, i.e.,
Ui(xi,
−→x ,Wi)−Ui(x′i,
−→x ,Wi) ≤ Ui(xi,
−→x ′,Wi)−Ui(x′i,
−→x ′,Wi). The
practical interpretation of a strategic substitute as applicable to this paper
is that an increase in the security investments of a user’s neighbors reduces
the marginal utility of the user, thus de-incentivizing him from investing.
This happens due to the positive externality a neighbor exerts on the user
through his own investments.
4The final wealth is the net user wealth resulting after getting covered
(uncovered) by a cyber-insurance policy in case of a loss (no-loss).
5Such knowledge can in practice be estimated via surveys.
C. Modeling Information Asymmetry
We assume two classes of users (insured users), one which has a
high chance of facing risks and the other which has a low chance. We
term these classes as ‘LC’ and ‘HC’ respectively. Let θ, (1 − θ) be the
proportion of users who run a high chance(low chance) of facing risk of
size r respectively. However, on grounds of adverse selection the insurer
cannot observe the class of any user. We consider two cases relevant to
adverse selection in the Internet: 1) the insurer and/or the insured user
have no knowledge about which risk class the insured falls in6 (most
pertinent w.r.t. the Internet and communication networks.) and 2) the
insurer has no knowledge of a user’s risk class but the user acquires
this knowledge (through third-party agencies)7 before/after signing the
contract but before it invests in self-defense investments. We assume
that each user in class i ǫ {LC,HC} invests an amount xi in self-
defense mechanisms after signing an insurance contract, which reduces its
probability pi of being affected by Internet threats. We list the following
mathematical properties related to our risk facing probability function p,
for users in classes LC and HC.
• p(x) is a twice continuously differentiable decreasing function with
0 > p′LC(x) > p
′
HC(x) and p′′i (xi) > 0, i.e., investments by users
in class LC are more effective in reducing the loss probability than
equivalent investments by users in class HC.
• pHC(x) > pLC(x).
• 1 > pHC(x) ≥ pLC(x) > 0, ∀x ǫ [0,∞).
We model moral hazard by assuming that the cyber-insurer cannot
observe or have knowledge about the amount of investments made by the
insured after signing the insurance contract. Regarding user investments,
apart from the self-defense investments made by a user, we assume a
certain minimum amount of base investments of value binv made by
an Internet user of class i prior to signing insurance contracts, without
which no user can be insured. Thus pi(binv) is the highest chance of
risk a user of class i may face.
The insurance company accounts for adverse selection and moral
hazard and designs an insurance contracts of the form Ci = (zi, ci),
for all users i in class j ǫ {LC,HC}, where zi is the premium and ci is
the net coverage8 for user i. An Internet user adopts the insurance contract
and invests in self-defense mechanisms to achieve maximum benefit. We
measure the benefit of users of a particular risk class i as a utility, which
is expressed as a function of contract Ci and self-defense investments
xi. We define the expected utility function for users in risk class i and
facing a risk of value r9 as an expected utility of final wealth, and it is
expressed as
EUi(Ci, xi) = A+ B, (2)
where
A = pi(xi)Ui(w0 − r + ci, xi,
−→x )
and
B = (1 − pi(xi))Ui(w0 − zi, xi,
−→x ).
Here wi0 is the initial wealth of user i and xi is the amount of self-defense
investment he makes and Ui() is an increasing continuously differentiable
function (U ′i(xi) > 0, U ′′i (xi) < 0) that denotes the utility of wealth.
Differentiating Equation (1) w.r.t. xi, we get the first order condition as
−p′i(xi)[Ui(wi0 − zk, xi,
−→x ) − Ui(wi0 − r + ck, xi,
−→x )] = 0 (3)
6This situation may generally happen when the users do not provide truthful
information to insurance agency questionnaires and both the insurer as well
as the insured cannot estimate the value of correlated and interdependent risks
posed to individual insureds.
7The third party agencies could be private organizations who might observe
intrusions into user security, however such steps have regulatory and neutrality
issues and thus are debatable in terms of practical implementation. We
consider this case in the paper for modeling completeness.
8By the term ‘net-coverage’ we mean the total coverage minus the premium
costs. Note that we do not include self-defense investments as part of initial
wealth of a user, but include the costs for investing in self-defense in the
utility function Ui for each user i.
9We assume an uniform value of risk for expositional simplicity.
The first order condition generates the optimal self-defense investment,
x
opt
i , for user i that maximizes his expected utility of final wealth.
In the following sections we analyze optimal cyber-insurance contracts
under the presence of moral hazard when 1) neither the insurer nor
the insured has any information regarding the risk class of a user,
2) the insurer does not have information regarding user class but the
insured acquires information after signing the contract but before making
self-defense investments, and (3) the insurer does not have information
regarding user class but the insured acquires information before signing
the contract.
IV. MECHANISMS FOR ALLEVIATING INFORMATION
ASYMMETRY
In this section, we design three mechanisms to alleviate information
asymmetry in cyber-insurance related to three different adverse selection
scenarios mentioned in the previous section. For each mechanism, the
outcome are the parameters of an optimal cyber-insurance contract, i.e.,
the coverage and the premium.
A. Neither the Insurer Nor the Insured Has Information
An Internet user i does not know his risk class and therefore he maxi-
mizes his expected utility of final wealth by considering his probability of
loss equal to an expected probability value of pαi (x) = θpHC(x) + (1−
θ)pLC(x) and solving Equation (3). α could be considered as the risk
class that each user feels he is in, as he does not have perfect information
about whether he is in class LC or HC10. We assume here that the
values of pLC(x) and pHC(x) are common knowledge to the insurer
and the insured. The cyber-insurer on the other hand, maximizes his
profits by offering an optimal contract (Cαi )opt = ((zαi )opt, (cαi )opt).
The optimization problem related to an insurer’s profit is given as
argmaxzα
i
,cα
i
,λα
i
,ρα
i
,ρ0
i
[1− pαi (x
α
i )z
α
i − p
α
i (x
α
i )c
α
i ]
subject to
EUαi ((C
α
i )
opt, (xαi )
opt)− EUαi (0, xi0) ≥ 0, (4)
−pα
′
i (x
α
i )[Ui(wi0−z
α
i , x
α
i ,
−→x α)−Ui(wi0−r+c
α
i , x
α
i ,
−→x α)] = 0, (5)
−pα
′
i (xi0)[Ui(wi0, x
α
i ,
−→x α)− Ui(wi0 − r, x
α
i ,
−→x α)] = 0, (6)
where xi0 is the amount of self-defense investments by user i when
no insurance is purchased. λαi , ραi , ρ0i are the Lagrangian multipliers
related to constraints (4), (5), and (6) respectively. Constraint (4) is the
participation constraint (Individual Rationality) stating that the expected
utility of final wealth of a user is atleast as much with cyber-insurance
as without cyber-insurance. Constraints (5) and (6) state that Internet
users will invest in optimal self-defense investments so as to maximize
their utility of final wealth, and this is in exact accordance to what the
cyber-insurer wants (i.e., to avoid moral hazard).
The optimization problem presented in this section11 is an example of
a general principal-agent problem. The Internet users (agents) will act
non-cooperatively as utility maximizers, whereas the principal’s (cyber-
insurer) problem is to design a mechanism that maximizes its utility
by accounting for adverse selection and moral hazard on the client
(agent) side. Thus, the situation represents a Bayesian game of incomplete
information [8]. According to Palfrey and Srivastava [30], there exists an
incentive-compatible direct revelation mechanism [37] for the problem
implementable in private value models, where users do what the insurer
desires (i.e., invest optimally in self-defense investments), provided the
constraints in the optimization problem bind, and the users do not use
weakly dominated strategies [8] in equilibrium.
10One could view α as an expected risk class/type a user feels he is in
given that he does not know his actual risk type.
11We also note that the optimization problems in the forthcoming sections
are all examples of general principal-agent problems.
We have the following lemma stating the result related to the solution
of the optimization problem.
Lemma 1. The optimal cyber-insurance contract under situations
when neither the insurer nor the insured have perfect information on the
risk type of the client, induces a partial coverage at fair premiums. In
addition, a pooling equilibrium (optimal) contract results for both high
and low risk users.
Proof Sketch: On route to solving our optimization problem, we
derive the Lagrangian [31] and first order conditions, and apply the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. We omit the proof in the paper
due to lack of space. Details of proof methodology can be found in [21].
Lemma Implications: The solution to the optimization problem in the
binding case tends to full insurance coverage as the utility function
tends to become increasingly risk averse, and partial insurance coverage
otherwise. It also generates a pooling equilibrium contract12 , which is
unique and entails partial cyber-insurance coverage at fair premiums.
Thus, we infer that a partial insurance coverage is optimal for the
cyber-insurer to provide to its clients as it accounts for the uncertainty
of user risk types. Intuitively, a pooling equilibrium works as neither the
insurer nor the insured has any information on user risk type and as a
result the cyber-insurer is not at a disadvantage regarding gaining risk
type information relative to the Internet users. The pooling equilibrium
establishes the existence of a market for cyber-insurance.
B. Insurer Has No Information, Insured Gets Information After
Signing Contract
In this scenario, we assume that the insurer does not have information
about the risk class of a user and it cannot observe the risk class if the
user obtains information from any third party agency. Since, the cyber-
insurer is the first mover, it will account for the fact that users will be
incentivized to take the help of a third party.
Let EUαi (Ci, xi) be the expected utility of user i in risk class α
for a contract Ci, when he cannot observe the risk class he is in. Let
θEUHC(Ci, xi) + (1 − θ)UHC(Ci, xi) be the expected utility of the
same user when he can get information about his risk class from a third
party agency. Thus, we denote the value to user i of gaining information
about his risk type w.r.t. contract Ci as V I(Ci), and it is defined for all
θ ǫ [0, 1] as
V I(Ci) = θEUHC(Ci, xi)+(1−θ)EUHC(Ci, xi)−EU
α
i (Ci, xi). (7)
We emphasize that V I(Ci) is zero if there is only type of risk class in
the market. Now let xij be the solution to Equation (3), for user i being
in risk class j having contract Ci. Since p′LC(·) < p′α(·) < p′HC(·), for
contract Ci, we have xLCi > xαi > xHCi . Thus, V I(Ci) > 0 due to the
following relationship
EUi(Ci, xij) > EUi(Ci, x
α
i ), j ǫ {LC,HC}. (8)
The cyber-insurer maximizes its profits by offering an optimal contract
C
opt
i = (z
opt
i , c
opt
i ). The optimization problem related to an insurer’s
profit is given as
argmax
zi,ci,λ
j
i
,ρ
j
i
,ρ
j
i0
∑
j=LC,HC
[1− pji (xi)zi − p
j
i (xi)ci]
subject to
EU
j
i (C
opt
i , x
opt
i )− EU
j
i (0, xi0) ≥ 0, j ǫ {LC,HC}, (9)
−pj
′
i (xi)[Ui(wi0 − zi, xi,
−→x )−Ui(wi0 − r+ ci, xi,
−→x )] = 0, ∀j, (10)
−pα
′
i (x
j
i0)[Ui(wi0, xi,
−→x )− Ui(wi0 − r, xi,
−→x )] = 0, j ǫ {LC,HC},
(11)
12A pooling equilibrium is one where the cyber-insurer has the same policy
for both the classes (high and low risk) of users and the contract is in
equilibrium.
where xi0 is the amount of self-defense investments when no insurance
is purchased by user i. λji , ρ
j
i , ρ
j
i0 are the Lagrangian multipliers related
to constraints (9), (10), and (11) respectively. Constraint (11) is the
participation constraint (Individual Rationality) stating that the expected
utility of final wealth of a user is atleast as much with cyber-insurance
as without cyber-insurance. Constraints (10) and (11) state that Internet
users will invest in optimal self-defense investments so as to maximize
their utility of final wealth (moral hazard constraints). We have the
following lemma stating the result related to the solution of the
optimization problem. The proof of the lemma follows from a similar
proof sketch as that for Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. The optimal cyber-insurance contract for each user i
induces a full coverage at fair premiums when V I(Ci) = 0 and induces
partial coverage at fair premiums when V I(Ci) > 0. In addition, a
pooling equilibrium (optimal) contract results for both high and low
risk users.
Lemma Implications: The solution to the optimization problem in
the binding case results in full insurance coverage if V I(Ci) = 0 and
partial insurance coverage if V I(Ci) > 0. If V I(Ck) > 0, which is
most likely the case, a user would prefer to have information on its
risk class and accept contract Copti rather than accept contract (Cαi )opt
(based on utility comparisons). Our optimization problem also generates
a pooling equilibrium contract, which is unique, and entails partial
coverage at fair premiums. Thus, we infer that the cyber-insurer finds its
optimal to provide partial insurance coverage to its clients as it accounts
for uncertainty of user risk types. Intuitively, a pooling equilibrium
works as neither the insurer nor the insured has any information on
user risk type before the user signs the contract, and as a result the
cyber-insurer is not at a disadvantage with respect to gaining information
on risk type relative to Internet users.
C. Insurer Has No Information, Insured Obtains Information Prior
to Signing Contract
In this scenario, we assume that the insurer does not have information
about the risk class of a user and it cannot observe the risk class if the
user obtains information from any third party agency prior to signing
the insurance contract. However, in this scenario a user that knows his
risk type is at a significant advantage. Since, the cyber-insurer is the first
mover, he will account for the fact that users will be incentivized to take
the help of a third party. We consider the case where the user may acquire
information about his risk type prior to signing the insurance contract,
and based on the information he decides on the contracts and in turn his
self-defense investments. We note here that users who remain uninformed
will choose contract CLCi as it is beneficial for the users to imitate the
the low risk type users than be of the ‘expected’ type.
We denote the value of gaining information to a user i as V I =
V I(CLCi , V I
HC
i ) and it is defined for all θ ǫ [0, 1] as
V I = EUHCi (C
HC
i , x
HC
i )+(1−θ)EU
LC
i (C
LC
i , x
LC
i )−EU
α
i (C
LC
i , x
LC
i ).
(12)
The cyber-insurer maximizes its profits by offering an optimal contract
C
opt
i = (z
opt
i , c
opt
i ). The optimization problem related to an insurer’s
profit is given as
argmax
zi,ci,λ
j
i
,γk
i
,ρ
j
i
,ρ
j
i0
∑
j=LC,HC
[1− pji (xi)zi − pi(xi)ci]
subject to
EU
j
i (C
opt
i , x
opt
i )−EU
j
i (0, xi0) ≥ 0, j ǫ {LC,HC}, (13)
EU
j
i (C
opt
i , x
opt
i )− EU
j
i (C
k
i , x
k
i ) ≥ 0, j, k ǫ {LC,HC}, (14)
−pj
′
i (xi)[Ui(wi0−zi, xi,
−→x )−Ui(wi0−r+ci, xi,
−→x )] = 0, j ǫ {LC,HC},
(15)
−pj
′
i (xk)[Ui(wi0−zk, xi,
−→x )−Ui(wi0−r+ck, xi,
−→x )] = 0, j, k ǫ {LC,HC},
(16)
−pα
′
i (xi0)[Ui(wi0)− Ui(wi0 − r)] = 0, j ǫ {LC,HC}, (17)
where xi0 is the amount of self-defense investments when no insurance
is purchased. λji , γki , ρ
j
i , ρ
j
i0 are the Lagrangian multipliers related
to constraints 13-17 respectively. Constraint (13) is the participation
constraint stating that the expected utility of final wealth of a user
is atleast as much with cyber-insurance as without cyber-insurance
(Individual Rationality). Constraint (14) is the incentive compatibility
constraint, which states that users prefer to accept contracts that are
designed to appeal to their types. Constraints (15), (16), and (17) state
that Internet users will invest in optimal self-defense investments so as
to maximize their utility of final wealth. We have the following lemma
stating the result related to the solution of the optimization problem.
The proof of the lemma follows from a similar proof sketch as that for
Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. The optimal cyber-insurance contract for each user i
induces a partial coverage at fair premiums. In addition, a separating
equilibrium (optimal) contract results for both high and low risk users.
Lemma Implications: Our optimization problem generates a separating
equilibrium contract13 , which is unique and entails partial cyber-
insurance coverage at fair premiums. Intuitively, a separating equilibrium
works as the cyber-insurer is aware of the fact that Internet users have
risk type information before they lay down the contracts and thus plans
different contracts for different types. In terms of optimal contracts and
cyber-insurer profits, the insurer is worse off than in the no-information
case because in the latter case, the insurer extracts all user surplus,
whereas in the former case, it extracts full surplus from the low risk
type users but only extracts partial surplus from high risk type users.
The separating equilibrium establishes the existence of a market for
cyber-insurance. We now have the following theorem whose proof
follows from lemmas 1, 2, and 3, and the fact that insurance purchase
needs to be made mandatory for users [28].
Theorem 1. A market for cyber-insurance can be made to exist
amongst risk-averse Internet users when (i) effective mechanism design
is used to alleviate information asymmetry scenarios and (ii) it is
mandatory for users to buy cyber-insurance.
Comment: We note that in the optimization problems stated above,
the output is only the optimal premium and coverage Through partial
coverage we shift additional liability to users to increase their investment
amounts (atop the optimal efforts enforced in the problem constraints),
thereby leading to increased overall security.
D. Effect of Topology on Contract Parameters
In this section, we briefly present and analyze results related to the
effect of user degrees on their cyber-insurance contract parameters. We
have the following lemma relating user degrees with cyber-insurance
coverage. We omit the proof in the paper due to lack of space. However,
the proof concept (sketch) relies simply on evaluating the first derivative
and second derivative of the deductible expression in the contract.
Lemma 4. The level of deductible (coverage) for each Internet
user i on a risk of size r increases (decreases) in a concave (convex)
manner with the degree of the user, i.e., dci
ddi
≤ 0, ∀i and d
2ci
dd2
i
≥ 0, ∀i,
under every adverse selection scenario.
Lemma Implications: The intuition for Lemma 4 holding true is the
13A separating equilibrium is one where the cyber-insurer has different
insurance contracts for both the classes (high and low risk) of users and the
contract is in equilibrium.
fact that with increase in user degrees one gets well connected with
his neighbors and invests less in self-defense investments but gains
greater expected utility than his lesser connected counterparts [29]. This
leads to a free riding phenomenon. Optimal cyber-insurance contracts
for users derived in this paper accounts for this fact and introduces a
control in terms of imposing higher deductibles (lesser coverage) to well
connected users, hence incentivizing them to invest more in self-defense
investments.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we used the principal-agent model in microeconomic
theory to address the information asymmetry problem in cyber-insurance
and proposed mechanisms to alleviate the problem. The optimal contracts
derived from our theory accounts for the topological location of each
user in a communication network, enforce Internet users to take more
responsibility in protecting their computing systems, and incentivizes
them to increasingly invest in self-defense mechanisms. This in turn
increases the overall network security. Through our mechanisms we also
showed the existence of single-cyberinsurer insurance markets for Internet
security. As part of future work, we plan to target multi-insurer cyber-
insurance markets.
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